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Abstract  
In January 2013 Trial Chamber V of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the 
cases of Samuel Ruto, Francis Muthaura and Uhuru Kenyatta, collectively known 
as the ‘Kenya decisions’, made a marked departure from the firm prohibition on 
‘witness proofing’ declared by Pre-Trial and Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga 
decisions.  This reversal illustrates the polarisation of an issue that has caused 
considerable controversy in the international legal community and demonstrates 
the challenges faced by the court in navigating such a controversy. While the 
practice may be viewed as a fault-line between two different procedural cultures, 
forever destined to be subject to debate, this article explores an alternative view.  
The article examines the reasons for the turnaround at the ICC and proposes an 
approach based on ‘principled pragmatism’. In doing so, it considers whether 
witness preparation is becoming regarded as a necessary part of the practice of 
the ICC.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The reliance on oral testimony in international criminal trials cannot be 
overstated. It is essential for victims and witnesses to give testimony in a 
manner, which protects their physical, emotional, and psychological well-being 
and also ensures that they give the ‘best evidence’ possible to the court.1 
Witnesses can find the experience of testifying in a foreign courtroom a 
challenging and daunting process. The face-to-face contact between a witness 
and counsel in preparation for that witness’s in-court testimony in the 
immediate period prior to trial has polarised international criminal judges, 
practitioners and academics alike; the fundamental question being whether the 
practice of witness proofing should be permitted or not.2  This article argues that 
an approach to witness preparation based on ‘principled pragmatism’ could 
provide a way forward for the ICC in dealing with the issue of witness 
preparation in the future.  It suggests that such an approach is reflected in the 
reasoning of the Samuel Ruto, Francis Muthaura and Uhuru Kenyatta cases 
                                                        
* Professor of Comparative Criminal Law & Procedure, University of Nottingham (UK) and 
Lecturer I Socio-Legal Studies, University of Leicester (UK).  
1 Helping witnesses achieve their best evidence is recognised as important in domestic 
proceedings as well. See in England and Wales, Ministry of Justice, Achieving Best Evidence in 
Criminal Proceedings: Guidance on Interviewing Victims and Witnesses, and Using Special Measures 
(2011 revision). However, it takes on particular importance in international proceedings where 
so much reliance is placed on oral testimony.   
2 See H. Garry, ‘Witness Proofing’ in L. Carter and F. Pocar (eds.), International Criminal Procedure 
(Edward Elgar, 2013) 66. 
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(Kenya decisions).3  In addition, the notion of principled pragmatism can be 
buttressed by data reflecting the experience of a number of international 
practitioners who were interviewed by the authors as part of a study designed to 
discover what evidentiary challenges they face in the cases they have been 
involved in. 4  
 
Principled pragmatism is built upon two guiding principles: the well-being of the 
witness about to testify and the integrity of the evidence to be given in court by 
the witness. The analysis will unfold in three parts. The first part of the paper 
explores how the systemic divergence towards witness proofing in the criminal 
procedures of national jurisdictions has reverberated on the international 
platform. The paper then moves from arguments based on systemic divergences 
to the arguments of principle for and against proofing that were used in the ad 
hoc tribunals and the Lubanga decisions.  The next section moves on to discuss 
the Kenya decisions and the concept of ‘principled pragmatism’ in order to 
demonstrate that in the complex area of pre-trial witness preparation rules 
should be based upon an approach that balances the responsibilities that the ICC 
has towards the witness and the truth-finding function of the institution. The 
final section looks in detail at the Witness Preparation Protocol that was annexed 
to the Kenya decisions. The preparation of witnesses for courtroom testimony 
will never be simple, but ultimately, it will be argued that the potential of  
‘principled pragmatism’ will only be realized if we move beyond systemic 
ideologies to developing ethical best practices.  
2. Systemic Divergences over Witness Proofing 
 
There is something of a mystery about where the term ‘witness proofing’ 
originates.  The American legal system has long endorsed the practice of 
preparing witnesses for giving testimony at trial but uses the term ‘witness 
preparation’ rather ‘witness proofing’ to describe this process.5  It has been 
                                                        
3 See Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02/11, 
Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Witness Preparation, ICC-
01/09-01/11, Trial Chamber, 2 January 2013. 
4 The study was funded by the Society of Legal Scholars, the Socio-Legal Studies Association, and 
the School of Law, University College Dublin. The fieldwork consisted of 37 face-to-face semi-
structured interviews with judges, prosecutors, investigators, defence counsel, and court officials 
from Chambers or the Registry, with the bulk of interviews carried out between September 2011 
and September 2012. All participants were granted anonymity. The aim of the research was to 
generate theory from the data to construct specific knowledge relating to lived experiences of 
evidentiary practices of international criminal practitioners. Grounded theory was the choice of 
methodology used as it allows for theory to be generated through the interaction of the data 
gathered and the researcher’s interpretation of what has been analysed, as opposed to having a 
preconceived concept. See generally, B. G. Glaser and A. L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded 
Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research, (Aldine Publishing Company, 1967) and N. Pidgeon 
and K. Henwood, ‘Grounded theory; practical implementation’, in T.E. Richardson (ed) Handbook 
of Qualitative Research Methods for Psychology and Social Sciences (British Psychological Society, 
1996). 
5 See S. Vasiliev, ‘From Liberal Extremity to Safe Mainstream? The Comparative Controversies of 
Witness Preparation in the United States’, 9(2) International Commentary on Evidence (2011) 
1554.  
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suggested that the term is used in Commonwealth adversarial systems. 6  But in 
truth it is not a term that is commonly used in these jurisdictions either. 
Whatever its origins, it is a term that has generated considerable controversy 
within the international legal community, although it is not one that can be found 
in the Statutes and Rules of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC. Those institutions 
that have endorsed the practice, including the ad hoc tribunals – the ICTY, ICTR, 
SCSL, and the STL – have described it in rather neutral terms as a ‘meeting held 
between a party to the proceedings and a witness, usually shortly before the 
witness is to testify in court, the purpose of which is to prepare and familiarize 
the witness with courtroom procedures and to review the witness’s evidence’.7  
To others, however, the term has come to be associated with the darker side of 
lawyering. The Trial Chamber in the Lubanga trial, for example, considered that 
the preparation of witness testimony by parties prior to trial would interfere 
with the Court’s mandate to establish the truth.8   
 
Such different attitudes towards proofing would be perplexing within any one 
particular legal system.  But within the international arena, no one legal system 
is pre-eminent. The challenge here is succinctly described by one of the 
respondents from our fieldwork as: 
  
[o]ne [that] is very endemic to the fact that we are an international tribunal and 
we have people coming from all different cultures and with that comes all 
different training, all different professional standards and all kind of different 
approaches.9 
 
We need to be clear here that we are not talking necessarily about any 
professional attachment that actors who have transitioned into the international 
arena have towards the domestic systems they have come from.  In the early 
days of the tribunals there was some evidence that practitioners had a tendency 
to ‘bring their domestic culture with them’.10  But as practitioners progressively  
migrate from one international tribunal to another, they adapt (willingly or not) 
to the specific demands made of them by international procedure.11 Rather, the 
differences that have emerged over the legality and merits of witness 
preparation would seem to have arisen from differing perceptions regarding the 
new procedural systems they were working in and what was demanded by such 
                                                        
6 C. Romano, ‘Deciphering the Grammar of the International Jurisprudential Dialogue’, 41 New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics (2009), 755, at 767. 
7 Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj and Brahimaj, Decision on Defence Request for Audio-Recording 
of Prosecution Witness Proofing Sessions, IT-04-84-T, 23 May 2007, para. 8.  
8 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and 
Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/06, 30 November 2007, para. 
52.  
9 Respondent 34, Court Official, Arusha, 18 September 2012. 
10 F. J. Pakes, ‘Styles of Trial Procedure at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia’, 17 Perspectives in Law & Psychology  (2003) 309.  
11 See J. Jackson and Y. M’Boge, ‘The Effect of Legal Culture on the Development of International 
Evidentiary Practice: From the “Robing Room” to the “Melting Pot”’, 26 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2013) 947. Of the 37 interviewees interviewed, 16 of them had experience of 
working in at least two international or internationalised tribunals as well as working in a 
domestic system.  See also E. Baylis, ‘Tribunal-Hopping with the Post-Conflict Justice Junkies’, 10 
Oregon Review of International Law (2008) 361.  
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systems. Here, as in so much of the development of international criminal law 
within the international criminal tribunals whether in its substantive or 
procedural aspect, the ideological shadows of the common law and civil law 
traditions have tended to loom large.12   
 
Sluiter has argued that the ad hoc system has adopted a common law approach 
towards what practices may permitted as the dominant question regarding 
whether a practice is lawful or not is whether there is a rule prohibiting it.13 
While there are clear rules prohibiting witness coaching and witness 
manipulation, there has been no such prohibition governing witness preparation 
or proofing.  Conversely, however, the ICC has adopted a much more civil law 
approach towards procedural developments requiring that there be a positive 
legal basis for the practice concerned.  Much of the reasoning in the Lubanga 
chambers was therefore devoted to considering whether there was anything in 
the ICC Statute or rules that might be construed as authorizing witness proofing.  
However, in the Kenya decisions Trial Chamber V appeared to take a more 
‘permissive’ approach towards the interpretation of the legal framework of the 
Rome Statute.14 In endorsing the practice, the Trial Chamber began once again by 
asking whether there is a legal basis for witness preparation. The Trial Chamber 
found authority in the broadly drafted Art 64 (3)(a) of the ICC Statute which 
provides that upon assignment of a case for trial, the Trial Chamber assigned to 
deal with the case shall confer with the parties and adopt such procedures as are 
necessary to facilitate the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings.  
Having considered that witness preparation is lawfully permitted, however, the 
Trial Chamber then took more trouble than the ad hoc tribunals had done to set 
out a complete list of permitted and prohibited conduct in the form of a witness 
preparation protocol appended as an Annex to both its decisions along with 
rules governing logistical matters and disclosure.  We shall return to the content 
of the decisions and the Witness Preparation Protocol later. For the moment, the 
point to be made is that Trial Chamber V took a more flexible approach towards 
what is lawfully permitted under the Rome Statute framework than the Pre-Trial 
Chamber and Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga cases and developed a protocol to 
govern proofing practice that served the pragmatic needs of the cases before it, 
albeit this could only be applied to those specific cases.   
 
Differences over the merits of witness preparation can also be ascribed to 
systemic divergence. Ambos has considered that there is an underlying ‘system 
dimension’ to proofing, by which he meant that the reason proofing has existed 
in the ad hoc system but not in the ICC system is because of structural differences 
between the systems with regard to the production and presentation of 
                                                        
12 See M. Bohlander, ‘Language, Culture, Legal Traditions and International Criminal Justice’, 12 
(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice (2014) 491.  
13 G. Sluiter, ‘Trends in the Development of a Unified Law of International Criminal Procedure’, in 
C. Stahn, and L. van den Herik (eds.), Future Perspectives in International Criminal Justice (Asser, 
2009). 
14 S. Finnin, ‘From Lubanga to Ruto: Witness proofing under the applicable law of the ICC’, in T. 
Mariniello (ed.), The International Criminal Court in Search of its Purpose and Identity (Routledge, 
2014) 567-612. 
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evidence.15  Thus in rebutting challenges to proofing, the ad hoc tribunals have 
consistently stated that it is a widespread practice in jurisdictions where there is 
an adversary procedure for parties, as those responsible for leading evidence at 
trial and to whom witnesses ‘belong’, to meet with potential witnesses 
beforehand.  In this context, parties have a right and a duty to hold these 
meetings.16  By contrast, the ICC has proceeded on the basis, as the Lubanga Trial 
Chamber put it, that the ICC Statute has created a procedural framework, which 
differs markedly from the ad hoc tribunals.17  By way of illustration, the Trial 
Chamber gave three examples:  the requirement in Article 54(1)(a) in the Rome 
Statute that the prosecution should investigate exculpatory as well as 
incriminatory evidence; the greater intervention permitted by the Bench; and 
the unique element of victim participation. Because of these additional and novel 
elements to aid the process of establishing the truth, the Trial Chamber 
considered that the procedure for preparation of witnesses before trial was not 
easily transferable into the system of law created by the ICC Statute and Rules.   
 
The assumption in this approach that proofing is an inherent part of the 
adversarial procedure and that it is in some way incompatible with the way in 
which the ICC system was established is, however, rather dubious when one 
looks at the practice of witness preparation within particular national systems. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga went too far when it observed that the 
practice of proofing has nothing to do with legal tradition.18  Witness preparation 
does seem to be universally disapproved of in classic civil law systems. But there 
is by no means unanimity of practice within adversarial systems in favour of 
such practices; as the Pre-Trial Chamber pointed out, those jurisdictions that 
consider it either unethical or unlawful include common law countries as well as 
civil law countries– for example, England and Wales, Scotland and Australia.19   
These examples are themselves somewhat misleading because both England and 
Wales and New South Wales have in recent years begun to permit more question 
and answer sessions between prosecutors and witnesses (in the form of pre-trial 
witness interviews).20  But they serve at least to show that there is no necessary 
                                                        
15 K. Ambos, ‘”Witness Proofing” before the International Criminal Court: a reply to Karemaker, 
Taylor and Pittman’, 21 Leiden Journal of International Law (2008), 911, at 912.  
16 Prosecutor v. Limaj, Decision on Defence Motion on Prosecution Practice of “Proofing” 
Witnesses, IT-03-66-T, 10 December 2004, 2, Prosecutor v. Sesay et al, Decision on the Gbao and 
Sesay Joint Application for the Exclusion of the Testimony of Witness TF1-141, SCSL-04-15-T, 26 
October 2005, para. 30, Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Decision on Ojdanic Motion to Prohibit Witness 
Proofing, IT-05-87-T, 12 December 2006, paras 16, 18-19, Prosecutor v. Karemera et al, Decision 
on Defence Motion to Prohibit Witness Proofing, ICTR-98-44-T, 15 December 2006, paras. 13, 15, 
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al, Decision on Defence Request for Audio-Recording of Prosecution 
Witness Proofing Sessions, IT-04-84-T, 23 May 2007, para. 17.  
17 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and 
Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/06, 30 November 2007, para. 
45. 
18 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and 
Witness Proofing, ICC-01/04-01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber, 8 November 2006, para. 37. 
19 Ibid., paras. 36-7. 
20 See Crown Prosecution Service, Pre-Trial Witness Interviews, Code of Practice, December 2005 
(England and Wales). See P. Roberts and C. Saunders, ‘Introducing Pre-Trial Witness Interviews – 
A Flexible New Fixture in the Crown Prosecutor’s Toolkit’, Criminal Law Review [2008] 831, 
Vasiliev, supra note 5. 
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connection between witness preparation and the adversarial tradition. Such a 
view represents a misunderstanding of the relationship in adversarial systems 
between parties and witnesses. Although parties decide what witnesses to call in 
their case, they do not, as is commonly thought, ‘own’ these witnesses and when 
called to testify they become witnesses of the court. 21 
 
However, if the ad hoc tribunals’ view that witness preparation is a necessary 
adjunct of the adversarial system is debatable, so also is the Lubanga decisions’ 
claim that it is in some way incompatible with the ICC system.  The particular 
examples given by the ICC to show that it has moved away from the more 
adversarial ad hoc systems are hardly very persuasive in illustrating that the ICC 
has moved so far towards the civil law system as to make witness preparation 
non-transferable. The fact that prosecutors have to investigate exculpatory and 
inculpatory evidence equally does not appear to exclude witness preparation.  
Indeed in so far as it involves clarifying the evidence of the witness as opposed to 
coaching the witness and requires that any new evidence to emerge must be 
disclosed to the defence, it would appear to be quite consistent with the neutral 
investigatory role that is invested in the prosecutor.  Similarly, it is not clear how 
intervention from the bench or victim participation obviates the need for witness 
preparation.22 As the War Crimes Research Office report on witness proofing 
pointed out,23 there remain considerable similarities between the practice of the 
ICC and the ad hoc tribunals, of which perhaps the most salient point  in terms of 
witness preparation, is that in most of the chambers the parties retain 
considerable control over deciding whom to call as a witness and the questioning 
of witnesses in the courtroom given that judges are not provided with a dossier 
or investigatory case file as in the traditional Romano-German tradition.24 The 
report also makes the point that the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC have 
jurisdiction over the same types of crime and often have to rely on testimony 
from victims who have had to travel far from their current homes to testify in a 
legal system that is foreign to them.  
 
The tendency to adopt a ‘systems’ approach in arguing for or against witness 
preparation is not only evident in the jurisprudence of the tribunals but is to be 
seen as well in the academic controversies.  Although the academic protagonists 
have been wary of the debate degenerating into an “‘adversarial versus 
inquisitorial’ struggle” and have expressed intentions to abstain from this 
dichotomy,25 it seems that they too find it hard to escape it.  Vasiliev has claimed 
that the academic altercation has been to a considerable extent framed by the 
clash between the common law and the civil law.26 One assumption that appears 
to be shared by some scholars is that witness preparation is systemically linked 
with adversarial procedure and argument has then proceeded on the question 
                                                        
21 See A. Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence (10th edn., Oxford University Press, 2014) 120. 
22 See War Crimes Research Office, Witness Proofing at the International Criminal Court, 
Washington College of  Law, 2009) 29.  
23 Ibid. 
24 See ICC Statute, Art. 69(2)-(3), ICC RPE 140(2). 
25 See e.g. R. Karemaker, B.D. Taylor and T.W. Pittman, ‘Witness Proofing in International 
Criminal Tribunals’, 21 Leiden Journal of International Law (2008) 683, at 684. 
26 S. Vasiliev, ‘Proofing the Ban on “Witness Proofing”: Did the ICC Get it Right?’, 20 Criminal Law 
Forum (2009) 193, at 204-5.  
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whether the ICC follows an ‘adversarial’ or ‘inquisitorial’ procedure.27  One 
argument that has been made is that because proofing is a necessary part of 
adversarial procedure, it did not need to be authorised by the ad hoc Statutes.28  
But as the ICC Statute does not constitute such an adversarial system and is more 
mixed, proofing would only be warranted before the ICC if it were provided for 
in its governing law, which is not the case.  Leaving aside the fact that the Kenya 
decisions found authority for such a practice in Article 64 as already mentioned, 
the underlying assumption that ICC and the ad hoc tribunals procedures are 
structurally so very different is, as we have seen, debatable.29  
 
While it is true that proofing is essentially unknown in the civil law, the 
argument that there is a systemic divide between common law and civil law 
attitudes towards proofing seems somewhat overdrawn. Until recently the 
professional codes of a number of common law countries including England & 
Wales expressly took a much more restrictive approach towards proofing, 
prohibiting discussion of proposed testimony between counsel and witness with 
an exemption for lay clients and character and expert witnesses.30 However, the 
difficulty with these systemic arguments is that they proceed upon the debatable 
premise that it is possible to link certain features universally to an adversarial 
format and contrast other features to a mixed or inquisitorial format.  Many 
years ago Damaška illustrated how problematic it can be to use historically-
based taxonomies in order to determine whether a system is ‘adversarial’ or 
‘inquisitorial’.31 In his view, the concepts of continental and Anglo-American 
legal traditions are too vague and open-ended to determine what is fundamental 
to the accusatorial/adversarial and inquisitorial type. It would seem more 
productive to consider the merits of witness preparation within the parameters 
of the actual systems in place rather than as practices necessarily connected to 
ideal systems. 
 
3.   Principled Disagreement over Witness Proofing 
 
While, as discussed above, the etymology of the term ‘witness proofing’ is 
unclear, it has given rise to such heated debate that it would seem profitable to 
begin any discussion of its merits by avoiding its use and unpicking those 
measures that are controversial and those that are less so from the range of 
practices that have been deployed to prepare witnesses for trial.32  The ad hoc 
                                                        
27 See, e.g. Karemaker et al, supra note 25, at 683, Ambos, supra note 15 and R. Karemaker, B. D. 
Taylor and T. W. Pittman, ‘Witness Proofing in International Criminal Tribunals: A Response to 
Ambos’, 21 Leiden Journal of International Law (2008) 917. 
28 Ambos, supra note 15.  
29 See also Karemaker et al, supra note 25. 
30 Vasiliev, supra note 5.  
31 M. Damaška, ‘Adversary System’, in S. H. Kadish (ed.), 1 Encyclopaedia of Crime and Justice 
(London: MacMillan, 1983) 24; M. Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority (Yale 
University Press, 1986) 4-6; M. Damaška, ‘Models of Criminal Procedure’, 51 Zbornik (2001) 477, 
at 478-482. 
32 Interestingly, the judges in the Kenyan cases avoided defining the term ‘proofing’ and confined 
themselves to defining ‘witness preparation’ and ‘witness familiarisation’. See Prosecutor v. 
Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecutor v. William 
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tribunals have consistently taken the view both before and after the Lubanga 
decisions in the ICC that what the ICC called ‘substantive preparation’ of 
witnesses for trial is permissible.33  As the Trial Chamber in the Limaj decision 
put it, the ‘process of human recollection is likely to be assisted … by a detailed 
canvassing during the pre-trial hearing of the relevant recollection of a witness … 
In particular, such proofing is likely to enable the more accurate, complete, 
orderly and efficient presentation of the evidence in the trial.’34 The ICTY and 
ICTR have endorsed in particular:  
 
 Preparing and familiarising a witness with the proceedings before the 
Tribunal;35 
 Showing the witness prior statements and exhibits likely to be used and 
questioning the witness on areas relevant to his or her testimony, including 
inconsistencies between prior statements and anything said during proofing;36  
 Identifying fully the facts known to the witness relevant to the charges, 
canvassing the relevant recollection of a witness;37  
 Examining in detail deficiencies and differences in recollection when compared 
with each earlier statement;38  
 Genuinely attempting to clarify the witness’s evidence; 39 and 
 Disclosing to the defence additional information or evidence prior to the 
testimony of a witness. 40  
  
The ad hoc tribunals, however, have drawn the line at rehearsing, practising or 
coaching a witness in giving his or her evidence, at training or tampering with a 
witness to mould his or her testimony, or manipulating the evidence of a witness, 
or influencing the content of the testimony of a witness in a way that shades or 
distorts the truth, or informing a witness about the specific substantive answer 
                                                                                                                                                              
Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Witness Preparation, ICC-01/09-01/11, Trial 
Chamber, 2 January 2013, para. 4.  
33 See Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala and Musliu, Decision on Defence Motion on Prosecution Practice of 
‘Proofing’ Witnesses, Case No. IT-03-66-T, 10 December 2004; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and 
Gbao, SCSL-04-15-T, Decision on the Gbao and Sesay Joint Application for the Exclusion of the 
Testimony of Witness TF1-141, 26 October 2005; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Case No. 
SCSL-04-15-T, Decision on the Gbao and Sesay Joint Application for the Exclusion of the 
Testimony of Witness TF1-141, 26 October 2005. See also Karemaker et al, supra note 25. 
34 Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala and Musliu, Decision on Defence Motion on Prosecution Practice of 
‘Proofing’ Witnesses, Case No. IT-03-66-T, 10 December 2004, para. 2. 
35 Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse and Nzirorera, Decision on Defence Motions to Prohibit 
Witness Proofing, ICTR-98-44-T, 15 December 2006, para. 15.   
36 Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al, Prosecution Response to General Ojdanic’s Motion to Prohibit 
Witness Proofing, IT-05-87-T, 29 November 2006, Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj and Brahimaj, 
Decision on Defence Request for Audio-Recording of Prosecution Witness Proofing Sessions, IT-
04-84-T, 23 May 2007.  
37 Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala and Musliu, Decision on Defence Motion on Prosecution Practice of 
‘Proofing’ Witnesses, IT-03-66-T, 10 December 2004.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al, Prosecution Response to General Ojdanic’s Motion to Prohibit 
Witness Proofing, IT-05-87-T, 29 November 2006. 
40  Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse and Nzirorera, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal 
Regarding Witness Proofing, ICTR-98-44-AR73.8, 11 May 2007. 
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he or she is expected to give, or preparing a witness to recite testimony learnt 
from the prosecution.41    
 
One ‘grey area’ that it has been argued was never satisfactorily resolved in the ad 
hoc tribunals is whether it is permissible to take a witness through the exact 
questions which are likely to be asked about in examination, cross-examination 
and re-examination.42  This practice would seem to have been approved in the 
prosecution’s Proofing Guidelines that were disclosed in the Haradinaj trial but 
no consistent view appears to have been taken across the ad hoc tribunals on  
it.43  This is illustrative of the tribunals’ failure to take an agreed uniform 
approach to proofing and prompted Jordash to remark that:    
 
Unfortunately, in the unquestioning acceptance of the value of proofing, the ad 
hocs have neglected to provide any meaningful guidance on an acceptable and 
uniform practice, leaving the parties to define its content and ethical parameters 
on a case-by-case basis… .44 
 
 
The Pre-Trial and Trial Chamber in Lubanga took an altogether more critical  
approach towards proofing practices, making a clear distinction between  the 
practice of ‘witness familiarisation’ and ‘substantive preparation’ of a witness. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber endorsed a set of ‘familiarisation’ measures, which the 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) described as ‘assisting the witness testifying with 
the full comprehension of the court proceedings, its participants and their 
respective roles, freely and without fear’.45 The specific practices mentioned by 
the OTP in the ‘Prosecution Information’ endorsed by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
were:46 
 
 Providing the witness with an opportunity to acquaint him/herself with the 
prosecution lawyer; 
 Familiarising the witness with the Courtroom, the Participants to the Court 
proceedings and the court proceedings; 
 Reassuring the witness about his/her role in the Court proceedings; 
 Discussing matters that are related to the security and safety of the witness; 
 Reinforcing to the witness that he/she is under a strict obligation to tell the 
truth; 
                                                        
41 See Karemaker et al, supra note 26, at 694.  A clear warning was issued by the Appeals 
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Karemera, ibid., at para. 13 that intentionally seeking to interfere with a 
witness’s testimony is prohibited.  
42 See W. Jordash, ‘The Practice of ‘Witness Proofing’ in International Criminal Tribunals: Why the 
International Criminal Court Should Prohibit the Practice’, 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 
(2009) 501. 
43 See Prosecution Response to Haradinaj Submissions on the Procedure for the Proofing of 
Prosecution Witnesses, 21 March 2007, para. 44 and Annex: Proofing Guidelines.  This practice 
seems to have disapproved of in the Karemera trial decision, supra note 34, at para. 23 but there 
is no constant line taken by the other tribunals.  
44 Jordash, supra note 42, at 504. 
45 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and 
Witness Proofing, ICC-01/04-01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber, 8 November 2006, para. 14.  
46 Ibid. 
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 Explaining the process of examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-
examination.  
 
Interestingly, these measures were permissible on the ground that they were a 
set of activities undertaken in order to assist the witness in the experience of 
giving oral evidence and the Pre-Trial Chamber did not view them, as the ad hoc 
tribunals have done, as part of a wider package of measures designed to produce 
effective testimony for the benefit of the proceedings as a whole. Indeed, the Pre-
Trial Chamber considered that these measures were not only permissible but 
were mandatory in accordance with the ICC Statute and the Rules of Procedure.47 
The Pre-Trial Chamber also diverged from the ad hoc practice in considering that 
these measures were more appropriately the responsibility of the Victims and 
Witness Unit (VWU)48 than that of the party or its counsel and considered it was 
not appropriate to label them as ‘proofing measures’.  
 
Both the Pre-Trial Chamber and Trial Chamber, however, drew the line at any 
‘substantive preparation’ of witnesses for trial.  The Trial Chamber, which was 
presided over by an English judge (Fulford J), stated that whilst accepted 
practice in England and Wales allowed a witness for the sole purpose of 
refreshing memory to read his witness statement prior to giving evidence, it 
permits neither substantive conversations between the prosecution or the 
defence and a witness nor any type of question and answer session to take place 
prior to the witness giving evidence.49 In following this approach it considered 
that allowing a witness to read his past statements would aid the efficient 
presentation of the evidence but that any discussion on the topics to be dealt 
with in court or on any exhibits that may be shown in court would not aid 
greater efficiency or the establishment of the truth.50 Rather, it was the opinion 
of the Trial Chamber that this could lead to a distortion of the truth that may 
come dangerously close to constituting a rehearsal of in-court testimony.  Before 
the Trial Chamber, the prosecution seemed to backtrack on the guidelines it had 
adopted in the ad hoc tribunals, which appeared to approve of taking witnesses 
through the questions likely to be asked. It assured the Trial Chamber that any 
questioning would not constitute a rehearsal of the questions that would be 
asked in court.  But the Trial Chamber did not see how this was practically 
achievable.  Even if there is no intent to coach or rehearse, the difficulty lies in 
preventing any questioning of the witness inadvertently modifying the witness’s 
testimony and interfering with the spontaneity of the witness’s evidence. The 
                                                        
47 Art. 57(3)(c) which imposes on the Chamber a duty to provide for the protection of victims and 
witnesses; Art. 68(1) which imposes on the Court a duty to take appropriate measures to protect 
the safety, physical and physical well-being, dignity and privacy witnesses and Rules 87 and 88 
which provide for a series of measures for the protection of witnesses. 
48 Art. 43 of the ICC Statute establishes the Victims and Witnesses Unit whose responsibilities 
include providing protective measures and security arrangements, counselling and other 
appropriate assistance to victims and witnesses who are at risk because of testifying.  
49 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and 
Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Chamber, 30 
November 2007, para. 42. 
50 Ibid., at para. 51.   
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Pre-Trial Chamber relied specifically on the English Court of Appeal decision in R 
v. Momodou (Henry):51  
 
… [T]he witness may come, even unconsciously, to appreciate which aspects of 
his evidence are perhaps not quite consistent with what others are saying, or 
indeed not quite what is required of him. An honest witness may alter the 
emphasis of his evidence to accommodate what he thinks may be a different, 
more accurate, or simply better remembered perception of events.  A dishonest 
witness will very rapidly calculate how his testimony may be improved. 
 
This principled objection to counsel engaging in any questioning of a witness 
seemed to lie at the heart of the ICC’s consistent prohibition on any ‘substantive 
preparation’ of witnesses for trial until the Kenya cases.52   
4. Moving towards Principled Pragmatism 
 
The context for understanding why the Kenya cases took a different approach 
towards witness preparation stems from the numerous allegations of witness 
tampering in Kenya generally, and in respect of the cases against Muthaura, 
Kenyatta, Ruto, and Sang the Prosecution had consistently warned of the fact 
that witnesses had been intimidated and/or interfered with. 53  The four 
prominent Kenyans had been accused of interfering or tampering directly or 
indirectly with witnesses that were to attend hearings in person. In the light of 
the ‘acute witness management challenges’ arising from these cases, the 
Prosecution sought modification of the prohibition on witness proofing.54 Thus, 
Trial Chamber V came to re-consider the question of witness proofing, and 
‘whether the practice should be adopted’ and in doing so, weigh up its ‘potential 
merits and risks’.55 In terms of the applicable law for sanctioning witness 
preparation, the Chamber confirmed it had the flexibility to ‘confer with the 
                                                        
51 [2005] EWCA Crim 177 [61]. It is worth noting that there is quite an extensive body of 
experimental, social psychological evidence to support the fear that attorneys can and do 
influence witness testimony via pre-trial interactions. See e.g. B.H Sheppard and N. Vidmar, 
‘Adversary Pretrial Procedures and Testimonial Evidence: Effects of Lawyer’s Role and 
Machiavellianism’, 39 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (1980) 320; N. Vidmar and  N. 
Mac Donald Laird, ‘Adversary Social Roles: Their Effects on witnesses’ communications of 
evidence and the assessments of  adjudicators’, 44 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
(1983) 888.    
52 See Prosecutor v. Katanga Ngudjolo, Decision on a Number of procedural issues raised by the 
Registry, ICC-01/04-01/07-1134, TC II, 14 May 2009, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Decision on the Unified Protocol on the practices used to prepare and familiarise witnesses for 
giving testimony at trial, ICC-01/05-01/08-1016, TC III, 18 December 2010.  
53 See generally B. Momanyi and S. Jennings, ‘Kenya Witnesses Face Harassment’, International 
Justice - ICC, ACR Issue 350, 5 June 2013, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/kenya-witnesses-face-
harassment; R. Cryer, ‘Witness Tampering and International Criminal Tribunals’, 27 Leiden 
Journal of International Law (2014) 191.  
54 Prosecution v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Prosecution Motion Regarding the 
Scope of Witness Preparation, ICC-01/09-01/11-446, 13 August 2012, para. 2; See also 
Prosecution’s Compendium of authorities in support of Prosecution Motion Regarding the Scope 
of Witness Preparation, 13 August 2012, ICC-01/09-01/11-447. 
55 Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecutor 
v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Witness Preparation, ICC-01/09-
01/11, Trial Chamber, 2 January 2013, paras. 34 and 30 respectively. 
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parties and adopt such procedures as are necessary to facilitate the fair and 
expeditious conduct’ of trial proceedings.56 After establishing that Article 64 
empowered the Chamber with the ability to ensure that ‘a trial is fair and 
expeditious and conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due 
regard for the protection of victims and witness’, the Trial Chamber went on to 
take the position that ‘judicious witness preparation aimed at clarifying a 
witness’s evidence’ and ‘carried out with full respect for the rights of the accused 
is likely to enable a more accurate and complete presentation of the evidence’ 
and assist the ‘Chamber’s truth finding function’.57 Witness preparation would 
‘enhance the efficiency, fairness and expeditiousness’58 of the trial as well as 
‘enhance the protection and well-being of the witnesses’ as per Article 68.59 
 
We would argue that the decisions of the Trial Chamber in the Kenya cases 
demonstrate the opportunity to develop an approach based on our concept of 
principled pragmatism. ‘Pragmatism’ is not a notion that is etymologically 
neutral in either legal or social terms, as there can be much contest over what is 
required in a particular set of circumstances.  We would argue that pragmatism 
should be guided by a set of governing principles. Principled pragmatism then 
considers the relative advantages and disadvantages of a practice by reference to 
how these principles can best operate in a specific system rather than basing the 
reasoning on pre-existing beliefs about an ideal system. Thus, rather than 
approach the question of proofing from a set a priori systemic or cultural 
preferences, it would seem better to try to look at the practical advantages and 
disadvantages of witness preparation from the perspective of the guiding 
principles of the well-being of the witness and the integrity of the evidence to be 
given in court. 
 
This would appear to be the stance taken by the Trial Chamber in the Kenya 
decisions.  It is not suggested that the judges involved set aside all their cultural 
and ideological preferences. As judges migrate from one international criminal 
                                                        
56 Ibid., at paras. 30 -34 and 26-30 respectively. The relevant parts of the ICC Statute, Article 64, 
as quoted in the decision are worth repeating here:  
 2.  The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted 
with full respect for the  rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and 
witnesses. 
 
3.   Upon assignment of a case for trial in accordance with this Statute, the Trial Chamber 
assigned to deal with the case shall: 
a) Confer with the parties and adopt such procedures as are necessary to 
facilitate the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings; 
      (b) Determine the language or languages to be used at trial; and 
(c) Subject to any other relevant provisions of this Statute, provide for 
disclosure of documents or information not previously disclosed, sufficiently in 
advance of the commencement of the trial to enable adequate preparation for 
trial.  
 
See generally, Finnin, supra note 14. 
57   Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02/11, 
Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Witness Preparation, ICC-
01/09-01/11, Trial Chamber, 2 January 2013, paras. 52 and 50 respectively. 
58 Ibid., at paras 39 and 35 respectively. 
59 Ibid., at paras. 41 and 37 respectively. 
 13 
tribunal to another, it would not be surprising if they did not form a preference 
for a particular way of doing things. Two of the judges in these cases held judicial 
positions in the ICTY and ICTR before they migrated to the ICC and they might 
have been disposed to favour the proofing practices permitted in these tribunals.  
The presiding judge, Judge Ozaki, had already taken a strong dissenting position 
in the Bemba decision when the other judges followed the ICC line taken in the 
Lubanga decisions.60 The point is rather that the arguments in the decisions are 
shaped around the experience of international criminal practice rather than 
rooted in the need to conform to some ideal systemic preference.    
1.    Principle I: Well-Being of the Witness 
The ICC Statute provides an elaborate framework regarding the witness 
protection and the cornerstone of this is Article 68. It imposes a mandatory duty 
on the Court to provide the appropriate measures for the protection of the 
safety, psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of the victims and witnesses. 
Indeed, one of the judges, Judge Van den Wyngaert characterized the ICC regime 
by its ‘victim-friendliness’ and a welcomed improvement as compared with the 
ad hoc tribunals.61  In terms of our concept of principled pragmatism, we would 
consider that the Court must consider what is required to ensure the physical, 
emotional and psychological well-being of the range of witnesses that come 
before it. While our definition is consistent with the ICC Statute, it uses broader 
terms to describe what is specified in the Statute.62 The investigation and 
prosecution of large scale crimes may necessitate the inclusion of evidence from 
certain categories of witnesses, for instance, victims of sexual violence, children 
and insider witnesses and their well-being must be considered in the pre-
testimony phase of the proceedings.  
 
In the Kenya decisions, partly dissenting Judge Eboe-Osiji aptly referred to the 
enhanced ‘ordeal’ factor that such witnesses experience when they testify before 
the ICC.63  He quotes from a Canadian book on witness preparation that:  
 
A tribunal is a foreign and hostile environment for the inexperienced witness. 
The formality of the setting and the unaccustomed procedures will cause anxiety 
and induce an inability to communicate effectively.64 
 
This observation had even greater force in relation to the average wintess that 
comes to testify before the ICC. The Chamber considered that the 10-minute 
courtesy meeting provided for in the Familiarisation Protocol does not best 
serve the Chamber’s duty to take appropriate measures to protect the well-being 
                                                        
60 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-1016, Decision on the Unified 
Protocol on the practices used to prepare and familiarize witnesses for giving testimony at trial 
(18 November 2010), TC III, paras 4 and 25.  
61 C. Van den Wyngaert, ‘Victims Before the International Criminal Courts: Some Views and 
Concerns of an ICC Trial Judge’, 44 Case Western Journal of International Law (2011), 475, 479 
62 For instance, ‘emotional well-being’ would incorporate what the ICC Statute describes as the 
dignity and privacy of witness in Article 68. 
63 Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, 
Decision on Witness Preparation, ICC-01/09-01/11, Trial Chamber, 2 January 2013, para. 11. 
64 B. Finlay, T. A. Cromwell and N. Iatrou, Witness Preparation – A Practical Guide (Canada Law 
Book, 2010), at 7.  
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and dignity of witnesses.65  Witnesses’ concerns extend beyond the individual 
protective measures accorded to them or the logistics of trial proceedings such 
as the layout of the courtroom and the role of parties and participants.  Their 
concerns may also result from anxiety about giving evidence, a lack of confidence 
in articulating their experiences and apprehension about cross-examination.  
This is supported by a recent report published by the Human Rights Center at UC 
Berkeley based on data collected in an interview survey of 109 witnesses who 
had testified in the trials of Lubanga and Katanga. 66  One of the findings of the 
report was that despite the familiarization process a few witnesses still felt 
unprepared when they took the stand.67 In the view of Trial Chamber in the 
Kenya decisions, witness preparation can help ensure that witnesses fully 
understand what to expect during their time in court and that they are able to 
communicate any concerns to the calling party. Prior preparation could 
particularly help vulnerable witnesses to reduce the stress of giving testimony as 
they may face unique difficulties in being questioned about traumatic events.  
Interaction with counsel on the substantive aspects of their evidence could 
reduce their reluctance to reveal sensitive information and this was particularly 
true in the Kenya cases.    
 
There is an important connection here between protecting the well-being of 
witnesses and the truth-finding functions of the Chamber. Protecting witness 
well-being is an explicit mandate of the Chamber but there is an instrumental as 
well as intrinsic value to this as it can assist the truth finding function of the ICC 
by eliciting testimony that might not otherwise be forthcoming. Some 
respondents in our research believed that proofing played an important role in 
mitigating the risk of witnesses recanting on their original statements. As one 
put it:  
 
If I cannot proof a witness then I don’t know if a witness has been threatened … 
You need to take time with the witness and ask ‘What the hell is going on? You’re 
changing your story to the one you told previously, you’re saying this but you’re 
not saying that.68  
 
Of course, these matters may be able to be put directly to the witnesses at trial.  
But adversarial justice has traditionally put severe constraints on the extent to 
which a party is able to cross-examine or impeach the credibility of his own 
witness.69  In certain situations a witness may be declared ‘hostile’ in which case 
                                                        
65 Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecutor 
v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Witness Preparation, ICC-01/09-
01/11, Trial Chamber, 2 January 2013, paras. 41 and 37 respectively. See also Victims and 
Witness Unit’s Unified Protocol on the practices used to prepare and familiarise witnesses for 
giving testimony at trial, ICC-01/05-01/08-972 and public Annex, ICC-01/05-01/08-972-Anx (22 
October 2010). 
66 Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley, Bearing Witness at the International 
Criminal Court: An Interview Survey of 109 Witnesses (Berkeley, California, June 2014). 
67 Indeed the report quotes one witness who says: ‘I should have been better prepared by the 
party that called me.’ Ibid., at 22. 
68 Respondent 12, Prosecutor, The Hague, 23 September 2011. 
69 See generally P. Roberts and A. Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (2nd edn., Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 338.  
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a previous statement, which is inconsistent with his or her present testimony 
may be admitted.70 Although the international tribunals would seem to have 
displayed more flexibility on whether witnesses must be declared hostile before 
they may be questioned on prior inconsistent statements, the decision whether a 
party will be allowed to put a previous statement to its own witness is one for 
the Trial Chamber and not for the calling party.71 There are undoubted 
advantages in terms of expediency and the witness’s well-being in court if these 
matters can be ironed out before the trial.  
 
2.   Principle II: The Integrity of the Evidence 
Although they refrain from linking the ICC with any particular domestic legal 
tradition, the Kenya decisions draw attention to the principle of the primacy of 
oral evidence established in Article 69(2).  Damaška has commented that the ICC 
gives Chambers considerable freedom to choose the proper way of organizing 
the production of evidence: they may let the parties question witnesses without 
interference from the bench, but they may also examine witnesses on their own – 
even prior to interrogation by the parties.72 Whatever method is chosen, 
however, the Kenya decisions make the point that the live testimony of 
witnesses, elicited through questioning by the parties, participants and the 
Chamber, is likely to constitute the most significant body of evidence in the case 
and as a result the manner in which witness testimony is presented to the 
Chamber is of particular significance:  
 
A witness who testifies in an incomplete, confused and ill-structured way 
because of a lack of preparation is of limited assistance to the Chamber’s truth 
finding function.73     
 
 
The integrity of the evidence speaks to the circumstances that enable the witness 
to give their best evidence possible in a relevant, accurate and structured 
manner without being overridden or corrupted by counsel. There are examples 
dating back to Nuremberg which point to the dangers that pre-testimonial 
contacts with counsel pose to the integrity of the evidence.74 But one must 
acknowledge the fact that a witness does not come into the courtroom 
completely free of any contact or influence, having already been in contact with 
investigators, registry officials, and the relevant calling party to say the least. 
                                                        
70 See Prosecutor v. Limaj, Decision on the Prosecution’s Motions to Admit Prior Statements as 
Substantive Evidence, Case no. IT-03-66-T, T. Ch., 25 April 2006.  These rules derive from section 
3 of the English Criminal Procedure Act 1865.  
71 See Prosecutor v. Popović, Decision on Appeals Against Decision on Impeachment of a Party’s 
Own Witness, Case no. IT-05-88-AR73.3, A.C., 1 February 2008; Prosecutor v Katanga Transcript, 
ICC-01/04-01/07,64-9, 9 February 2010. 
72 M. Damaška, ‘Problematic Features of International Criminal Procedure’ in A. Cassese (ed.), The 
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (OUP, 2009), 175, 176. See ICC Statute Art 
64(8), RPE 140(1). 
73 Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecutor 
v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Witness Preparation, ICC-01/09-
01/11, Trial Chamber, 2 January 2013, paras. 35, 31 respectively. 
74 See A. Sarvarian, ‘Ethical Standards for Prosecution and Defence before International Courts: 
The Legacy of Nuremberg’, 10 Journal of International Justice (2012) 423, 439-440. 
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Critically, integrity is not solely equated with the spontaneity of evidence given. 
Proofing is often characterized as a corruption of witness evidence, detracting 
from its integrity or spontaneity. The idea is that there is a fixed reality of what a 
witness saw or heard which has to be conveyed to the court in pristine form. As 
the Trial Chamber pointed out, however, by the time a witness comes to testify at 
trial, he or she has already told his story to a variety of actors, including 
investigators and lawyers, producing written statements, so the notion of there 
being spontaneity in any absolute sense is ‘misplaced’. 75 The truth is, of course, 
that giving evidence is a process of communication and interaction and the 
environment in which it is elicited inevitably plays a role. What is important is to 
create an environment in which witnesses are able to give their best account of 
what they believe happened.   
  
In order to elicit focused and structured testimony and to ensure that all 
probative evidence is presented, the Chamber considered that it was important 
that counsel are well prepared and fully acquainted with each witness’s 
evidence. A pre-testimony meeting between the calling party and the witness 
was a ‘last opportunity for the calling party to determine the most effective way 
to question its witnesses and which topics will elicit the most relevant and 
probative evidence […]’76 The Chamber referred to the ad hoc procedures and a 
number of largely common law systems such as Australia, Canada, England & 
Wales, the US, New Zealand (but also Japan) where questioning is dominated by 
the parties.77 However, it also made reference to the specific circumstances of 
international criminal litigation, which would appear to favour witness 
preparation.78  In particular:  
 
…[T]he crimes under the jurisdiction of this Court are complex, both as regards 
the factual circumstances and legal issues involved. Consequently, witnesses 
may have to give complicated and delicate evidence in the courtroom. At the 
same time, many of the witnesses have no experience in a courtroom, come from 
places far from the seat of the Court and come from a variety of cultural and 
linguistic backgrounds. They are often unfamiliar with the Court’s system of 
questioning and cross-examination. In addition, witnesses testifying before this 
Court are often asked to recount events that occurred many years ago.  As a 
result, there is an increased likelihood that witnesses will give testimony that is 
incomplete, confused or ill-structured. 79  
 
These were factors that a number of professionals who had experience of 
litigating in the international tribunals mentioned in our study. While we are not 
suggesting a comprehensive view from the field, within our sample there was a 
                                                        
75 Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02/11, Trial 
Chamber, 2 January 2013, para. 43. See also Karemaker et al, supra note 28, 921, describing the 
notion of absolute spontaneity as ‘imaginative’.  
76 Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecutor 
v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Witness Preparation, ICC-01/09-
01/11, Trial Chamber, 2 January 2013, paras. 38 and 44 respectively. 
77 Ibid, paras. 39 and 35 respectively. 
78 Ibid, paras. 40 and 36 respectively.  
79 A number of these factors were also mentioned in the decisions of the ad hoc tribunals. See e.g. 
Prosecutor v. Karemera et al, Decision on Defence Motions to Prohibit Witness Proofing, ICTR-98-
44-T, para. 17.    
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division of opinion as to the merits of witness preparation – one respondent 
considered it was problematic philosophically80 – but there was an acceptance 
that within the context of international practice it had many advantages. Due to 
some of the poor ways in which many witness statements had been prepared, 
proofing could clarify whether in fact a witness statement was going to be useful 
for the trial.   Often it transpired that witnesses had not themselves seen the 
events they testified to but had merely received information about them second 
hand.  As one prosecutor put it:  
 
Let’s say my basic witness is an uneducated farmer that had just been a survivor 
or perhaps a perpetrator in prison. My rough experience was that every three 
witnesses I met, one was useful for trial, and so 67% of my pre-trial preparation 
was meeting witnesses who were not really helping to prove my case.81 
 
What is useless for one party, however, may be useful for another. As well as 
filtering out non-useful witnesses, witness preparation can enable new facts to 
be revealed and what are called ‘will-say’ statements to be disclosed to the other 
parties so that an opportunity is given to them to make use of a witness whom 
the prosecutor has found useless.82   
 
[T]here’s nothing to refresh the memories of the witnesses in court so all you do 
is you go to court hoping that your witness remembers as much as possible 
events that happened. Now I think that is where the prosecutor’s role is so 
fundamentally important, helping the witness to remember the facts as best as 
they could.83 
 
Of course, all these matters could come to light in the courtroom – but inevitably 
this would waste court time or lead to the trial having to be adjourned in order 
to investigate new facts that had come to light. 
 
All this is not to deny that witness preparation can be abused and the Kenya 
decisions expressed a keen desire to obviate these dangers. The TC considered 
that given the costs to truth finding when witnesses are required to take the 
stand ‘cold’, any spontaneity lost in the course of witness preparation is 
considerably outweighed by the gains of preparation.84 It did nevertheless  
consider the need for safeguards to deal with the risks, adverted to by the 
defence, that witness preparation could improperly influence the testimony of a 
witness, that it could be used as a substitute for thorough pre-trial investigations 
and that it could result in late disclosure.  These risks could be mitigated by 
                                                        
80 Respondent 6, Prosecutor, The Hague, 21 September 2011. 
81 Respondent 18, Prosecutor, The Hague, 17 April 2012. 
82 See V. Tochilovsky, Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Courts and the European Court of 
Human Rights: Procedure and Evidence (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), 464 where he describes a will 
say as follows: ‘A will say statement is a communication from one party to the other party and the 
Chamber anticipating that a witness will testify about matters that were not mentioned in the 
previously disclosed witness statements.’, See also Prosecutor v. Simba, Decision on the 
Admissibility of Evidence of Witnesses KDD, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Trial Chamber I, 1 
November 2004, para. 9.  
83 Respondent 28, Prosecutor, Arusha, 19 September 2012. 
84 Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on Witness 
Preparation, ICC-01/09-01/11, Trial Chamber, 2 January 2013, para. 43.  
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establishing clear guidelines establishing permissible and prohibited conduct 
and it appended a Witness Preparation Protocol as an Annex to its decision.   
 
5. The Witness Preparation Protocol 
 
Beyond the overarching question of whether witness preparation should be 
sanctioned based on its advantages and disadvantages, the protocol provided a 
list of permitted and prohibited conduct, along with rules governing logistical 
matters and disclosure. In our view, the content of the protocol is a welcome 
starting point for the ICC to delineate ‘the boundaries of effective preparation of 
witnesses on one end and inappropriate preparation leading to untruthful 
testimony on the other end’85 and the ‘grey areas’ of discretion’ where, as 
Jordash has warned, the potential conflict - between the duty to represent their 
client or case zealously and the duty to present only that which is believed to be 
the truth - must be reconciled.’86  
 
The protocol states that the aims of witness preparation are: 
 
(1) To assist the witness who will be giving evidence: 
 To help ensure that the witness gives relevant, accurate and structured 
testimony;  
 to help ensure the well-being of the witness.  
 
(2) To assist the calling party to assess and clarify the witness’s evidence in order to 
facilitate focused, efficient and effective questioning.  
 
One can see from the outset that the principal actors addressed by the protocol 
are the witnesses themselves and the calling party to whom they ‘belong’. While 
this may appear to betray an ideological preference for an adversarial type of 
system, it may rather be seen as an expression of the pragmatic benefits for 
witnesses in devolving responsibility to the calling party within a system that 
remains substantially party-driven.  Consider the following passage from the 
decision: 
 
Witness preparation can help to ensure that witnesses fully understand what to 
expect during their time in court and that they are able to communicate any 
concerns to the calling party, including case-specific questions which the VWU 
would be unable to address […] Enabling interaction with counsel on the 
substantive aspects of their evidence may help to increase witnesses’ confidence 
and may reduce their reluctance to real sensitive information on the stand.87 
 
Implicitly, the protocol reflects the Chamber’s view of the limitations of the VWU 
in these matters and consequently the Familiarisation Protocol in preparing a 
                                                        
85  G. L. Shargel, ‘Federal Evidence Rule 608(B): Gateway to the Minefield of Witness Preparation’ 
(2007) 76 Fordham Law Review 1263, 1271. 
86 Jordash, supra note 42, at 512. 
87 Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecutor 
v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Witness Preparation, ICC-01/09-
01/11, Trial Chamber, 2 January 2013, paras 41, 37 respectively. 
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witness for trial. The Witness Preparation Protocol recognises the need for 
calling parties to coordinate ‘practical arrangements’ with the VWU, and when it 
comes to vulnerable witnesses, the VWU are required to ‘be available to assist 
with vulnerable witnesses if necessary’.88  We would argue that coordination 
with the VWU is critically importance for the wellbeing of the witness.  However, 
there remains scope for confusion on the part of witnesses, the parties and the 
VWU  between the responsibilities of the VWU, as per the Familiarisation 
Protocol and those of the calling party, as per the Witness Preparation Protocol.  
 
The Witness Preparation Protocol provides further operational guidance in 
respect of location, timing and record keeping. Preparation sessions have the 
flexibility to take place either at the seat of the Court in the Hague or elsewhere 
where the testimony is taking place. This is consistent with the possibility for the 
Court to sit outside of the Hague as provided in Article 3 of the Rome Statute.89 
However, the overriding factor that determines the location of a witness 
preparation session is the security of the witness, and it again falls on the calling 
party to decide the location.90 Such an undertaking, in our view, would 
necessitate coordination between the VWU which not only has the statutory 
mandate to provide protection, support and other appropriate assistance, but 
also has the appropriate skills and expertise to deal with the safety and security 
procedures of witnesses. Again it would have been prudent for the Trial 
Chamber to have explicitly included the need for such coordination in the 
protocol.  
 
With reference to timing, the protocol states that sessions must only begin after 
witness statements have been taken and disclosure has taken place.91  The 
protocol further provides that completion of the preparation sessions must take 
place ‘as early as possible’ and at least ’24 hours before the witness’s testimony 
is due to commence.’92 But one question is whether this does enough to 
discourage what Jordash has referred in the ad hoc context to as the ‘unhealthy 
acceptance of poor investigative processes and unsatisfactory disclosure 
practices’ on the part of the prosecution, blurring the line between the 
investigative phase and the pre-trial preparation phase.93  The negative impact 
this can have upon the defence was highlighted  by a defence counsel respondent 
in our study, who when talking about preparing a defence case made the 
following observations: 
 
[It] is a combination of the material you’re getting from the Prosecution, but obviously 
your client […] has his version of the events and the first thing is to understand how the 
client’s version differs from the Prosecutor’s version, and then the main focus of 
preparation is on witnesses […] [T]he most practical thing to do is immediately strike an 
understanding of who’s going to testify and what they’re going to testify about […] [S]o 
our biggest challenge was how to understand what these witnesses had said before, how 
                                                        
88 Ibid. Witness Preparation Protocol, paras. 5, 6, and 7. 
89 Para 8 of the Witness Preparation Protocol.  
90 Para. 9 of the Witness Preparation Protocol.  
91 Para. 10 of the Witness Preparation Protocol. 
92 Para. 11 of the Witness Preparation Protocol. 
93 Jordash, supra note 42, at 518.  
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their versions might or might not be contradicted and that’s basically how we started to 
prepare.94 
 
If preparation sessions are allowed to take place in the period after witness 
statements and initial disclosure  right up until the 24 hours deadline before the 
witness is due to testify, this can have a serious prejudicial effect on defence 
counsel’s preparation of the case and raises some significant concerns regarding 
the fairness of proceedings and the equality of arms. These concerns are 
compounded by the fact that as the complexity of the trial unfolds, defence 
counsel may be left in position where they are faced with frequent late 
disclosure of information throughout the Prosecution case. Returning to the 
overall aims of witness preparation and the context in which the conduct above 
takes place, the protocol explicitly states that witness preparation should not be 
conducted for the purpose of seeking new evidence or continuing the calling 
party’s investigations.95 The defence in the Ruto and Kenyatta cases were 
concerned that witness preparation could be used by the prosecution to 
continue its investigations during the trial stage and certainly there have been 
cases in the ad hoc tribunals where the new information has been disclosed at 
the last minute limiting the defence opportunity to prepare its defence.96  The 
Trial Chamber made it clear that the defence is not to be prejudiced by late 
proofing sessions when it stated that: 
 
[W]itness preparation is to be used to review and clarify the witness’s evidence. It is not 
meant to function as a substitute for thorough investigations, nor as a way to justify late 
disclosure[…] The Chamber is of the view that such pre-testimony disclosure is 
preferable to requiring the opposing party to react to new evidence only when the 
witness is on the stand[…] the use of such additional evidence will be controlled by the 
Chamber in order to ensure that defence is not prejudiced.97 
 
 
It is regrettable that the Trial Chamber did not use the opportunity of the 
protocol to move away from the negative ad hoc tribunal experience of late 
disclosure by stipulating a more concrete timetable that would significantly 
mitigate the shortfalls experienced by the ad hoc tribunals and encourage 
improved investigative processes and case preparation by the calling parties. 
Instead, the only mention of disclosure is in the final paragraph of the protocol, 
where it is stated that information that is subject to disclosure that emerges from 
the preparation session must be disclosed ‘as soon as practicable, and in any 
event before the witness begins his or her examination in chief’.98 The failure by 
                                                        
94 Respondent 20, Defence Counsel, The Hague, 18 April 2012. 
95 Para. 2 of the Witness Preparation Protocol. 
96 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Decision on Joint Defence Motion on Prosecution’s Late and 
Incomplete Disclosure, Case No. IT-03-66-T, 7 June 2005; Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, 
Decision on Defence Motion for Exclusion of Evidence arising from the Supplemental Statements 
of Witnesses TF1-113, TF1-108, TF1-330, TF1-041 and TF1-288, Case No. SCSL-04-15-7, 27 
February 2007. For a robust critique of the late disclosure practices accepted by the ad hoc 
tribunals, see Jordash, supra note 42, at 515-520. 
97 Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecutor 
v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Witness Preparation, ICC-01/09-
01/11, Trial Chamber, 2 January 2013, paras. 46 and 42 respectively. 
98 Para. 30, Witness Preparation Protocol. 
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the Trial Chamber to address this issue in a more detailed fashion was, in our 
view, a lost opportunity and is likely to lead within the ICC to the kind of reactive 
measures that were used in the ad hoc practice to remedy late disclosure, such as 
adjournments or postponements of proceedings where the witness is due to 
testify.  
 
Moving on to the substantive content of what conduct is involved in the 
preparation sessions and where the permissible boundaries of preparation lie, 
the protocol sets out a list of permitted and prohibited conduct.99 Permissible 
conduct includes reviewing earlier statements and questioning on any 
inconsistencies; explaining the topics intended to be covered in examination in 
chief and which may be covered during cross-examination; showing the exhibits 
and asking for comment on them. Prohibited conduct includes seeking to 
influence the substance of the witness’s answers, undertaking to train the 
witness or practice the questions and answers and inform the witness of the 
evidence of other witnesses.  Here the protocol offers some helpful guidance and 
paves the way towards identifying best practice and achieving consistency of 
approach. It gives the calling party an understanding  of how to meet the needs 
of witnesses, treating them appropriately, professionally and with respect at all 
times and of what can be ethically expected in preparing the witness for trial.  
 
At the same time, there would appear to be a number of ‘grey areas’ that remain 
unresolved between what is permissible and what is prohibited conduct. It will 
be recalled that one issue that was unresolved by ad hoc tribunals was whether it 
was permissible to take parties through the questions they are to be asked. 
Paragraphs 20 and 21 of the protocol permit the parties to explain ‘in general 
terms’ what  topics are likely to be covered while paragraph 28 prohibits the 
practising of  the questions and answers expected.  But it may not be easy to 
draw a clear line between these two types of conduct. Partly dissenting Judge 
Eboe-Osuji referred to the boundaries between 
preparation/practising/rehearsing and expressed  some ‘slight’ disagreement 
with the other Chamber judges on  the matter.100 Notably, he disagreed that 
practising or ‘rehearsing’ should, as a general proposition, be considered to be  
‘necessarily incompatible with the ethics and the more welcome aspects of 
witness preparation’ and he went  on to say: 
 
Practising the testimony can be a sensible and quite practical way of not only imbuing 
the witness with some measure of confidence, but also to identify and possibly tease out 
problem spots with delivery for purposes of enhancing efficiency in court-room 
testimonies.101 
 
 At same time, Judge Eboe-Osuji was not unaware of the risks that may be 
associated with rehearsing or practicing and he reflected that:  
 
the main problem with [it] lies in the risk that it could be overdone - to the point of 
encouraging witnesses to memorise veritable scripts in terms of the anticipated 
                                                        
99 Paras. 15-29, Witness Preparation Protocol. 
100 Partly dissenting decision, para. 49. 
101 Partly dissenting decision, para. 50. 
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substance of the testimony as well as the sequence of how the testimony should unfold. 
Even so, this is not ethically problematic, if no perjury is involved.102 
 
But this only serves the blur the boundaries further between what ‘practising’ 
should be acceptable and what should be considered ‘overdone’.  Any discussion 
about the substantive content of witness preparation must address the  
boundaries between practising/rehearsing/coaching in substantive terms. 
 
There remains the central concern raised by the Lubanga decisions of 
unintended influence where there may be no intention to plant ideas in the head 
of the witness but the witness mistakenly perhaps takes certain cues from 
counsel and alters his or her testimony accordingly.  In the Ruto and Kenyatta 
decisions the Trial Chamber considered that this was a risk that was just as 
prevalent during the investigation phase and it did not think that witness 
preparation, properly conducted, was likely to result in substantive alterations 
to a witness’s testimony.103 It pointed to the protocol prohibition on giving a 
witness any information during preparation concerning the testimony of other 
witnesses and pointed to the safeguard of cross-examination.104 One of the 
further safeguards set out in the protocol is that the calling party is required to 
video-record the preparation session and keep a log of each preparation session 
informing other parties of the log.  The Ruto and Kenyatta decisions also explain 
that a non-calling party may require the Chamber to order the disclosure of the 
video where there is a concrete and credible basis for the request.105  This is a 
valuable safeguard that was made the subject of an order in the ad hoc Haradinaj 
trial.106. However, one can question why the other parties need to provide a 
‘concrete and credible’ basis for the request to view the video.  There may be 
issues of privilege to protect but if one of the aims of keeping a record is to try to 
uncover whether there has been any unintended influence on the witness, there 
is no basis for considering that this may have happened until one is able to view 
the video. It is interesting that in this connection the Code for Pre-Trial Witness 
Interviews in England and Wales states that all interviews must be audio-
recorded and that, subject to the application of public interest immunity, the 
recording will be supplied automatically to the defence as unused material.107    
 
Finally, to guard against preparation abuse, there clearly need to be sanctions for 
non-compliance, yet the sanctions provided for the breach of the protocol are not 
clearly set out.108  It is unclear who is to be charged with investigating and 
prosecuting any misconduct and whether sanctions are available.  Defence and 
victims counsel are governed by the ICC Code of Professional Conduct for 
Counsel which provides sanctions for violation by these counsel of any 
                                                        
102 Partly dissenting decision, para. 51. 
103  Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02/11, 
Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Witness Preparation, ICC-
01/09-01/11, Trial Chamber, 2 January 2013, paras. 44, 39 respectively. 
104Ibid., at paras. 44, 39 and  paras. 48, 45 respectively. 
105 Ibid., at paras. 50, 47 respectively. 
106 Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Decision on Defence Request for Audi-Recording of Prosecution 
Witness Proofing Sessions, IT-04-84-T, 23 May 2007,_ 
107 Crown Prosecution Service, Pre-Trial Witness Interviews: Code of Practice (2008). 
108 See International  Bar Association, Witnesses before the International Court (2013), 24. 
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provisions of the Code, the Statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence or 
Regulations of the Court.109  Although such a Code does not extend to the OTP, 
Trial Chamber V ruled in the Kenyatta case that the Code should apply to the 
members of the Prosecution.110  The OTP has since adopted its own Code which 
includes a prohibition on corruptly influencing a witness.111 The Witness 
Protocol is a more detailed document setting out clearer lines between 
prohibited and permitted conduct. But if it cannot be enforced it clearly has more 
limited efficacy.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
It is not suggested that the Kenya decisions will draw a line under the proofing 
controversy.  Citing these decisions among others, the STL Trial Chamber has 
stated that the practice of witness preparation ‘forms part of international 
criminal law procedure’ and is used in the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC.112 The 
Hague Principles on Ethical Standards for Counsel Appearing before 
International Courts and Tribunals promulgated by the International Law 
Association in 2010 permits the practice, subject to such rules as the 
international court or tribunal may have adopted.113 But the position in the ICC is 
far from settled.  The defence appealed for leave to appeal the decisions which 
was rejected with the result that there is as yet no definitive ruling from ICC 
Appeals Chamber on the matter. Moreover, the main safeguards in the form of 
the Witness Preparation Protocol are only applicable in the Kenya cases and 
there is uncertainty therefore about the practice in other Chambers. However, 
the emphasis in these cases on how witness preparation may assist the well-
being of witnesses and the integrity of the evidence in the unique circumstances 
that many witnesses face in international proceedings, along with an 
appreciation of the risks involved, provided a focused cost benefit analysis of the 
practice within the international setting which may help to mitigate the kind of 
‘systemic’ arguments which it has been suggested have not helped towards 
finding consensus. The decisions accord with the views expressed in our own 
interviews where most, though not, all practitioners considered that within the 
particular context of international proceedings the balance of advantage 
favoured proofing, provided there were sufficient safeguards built into the 
process.  Despite its weaknesses, the Witness Preparation Protocol is an 
important first step in delineating exactly where the boundaries should lie and 
what the safeguards should be. The challenge for the Court will be to develop 
these further in the spirit of ‘principled pragmatism’.  
                                                        
109 Art. 31 of the Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel, ICC-ASP/4/Res 1-Ann. Art 70(1) of 
the ICC Statute makes it an offence for counsel to influence a witness or other evidence in an 
impermissible manner. See T. Gut, Counsel Misconduct before the International Criminal Court 
(Hart, 2012) 238.  
110  Prosecutor v. Uhuru Mugai Kenyatta, Decision on the Defence application concerning 
professional ethics applicable to prosecution lawyers, ICC-01/09-02/11-747. 31 May 2013.  
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